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_______________ 
 
OPINION OF THE COURT 
_______________ 
 
KRAUSE, Circuit Judge. 
 
This case arises from an undisputed constitutional 
violation: an act of excessive force committed during the arrest 
of Appellant Emil Jutrowski in which he was kicked in the 
face, breaking his eye socket. Appellees—consisting of two 
Riverdale, New Jersey Police Officers and two New Jersey 
State Troopers involved in the arrest (the “Individual 
Defendants”), and their respective employers, the Township of 
Riverdale and the State of New Jersey (collectively, the 
“Defendants”)—do not dispute that one of the officers kicked 
Jutrowski. But each of the Individual Defendants asserts he 
neither inflicted the blow himself nor saw anyone else do so, 
and Jutrowski, whose face was pinned to the pavement when 
the excessive force occurred, is unable to identify his assailant. 
He therefore brought excessive force claims against all 
Defendants and conspiracy claims against the four Individual 
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Defendants under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The District Court, 
however, relying on our precedent that a defendant in a civil 
rights action must have “personal involvement” in the alleged 
wrongs, Rode v. Dellarciprete, 845 F.2d 1195, 1207–08 (3d 
Cir. 1988), determined that Jutrowski’s inability to identify his 
attacker was fatal to his claims and granted summary judgment 
in Defendants’ favor. 
 
We are now called upon to outline the contours of this 
“personal involvement” requirement in § 1983 cases and to 
consider its application when a plaintiff who indisputably 
suffered a constitutional injury at the hands of one officer 
comes up against to the proverbial “blue wall of silence.” 
Despite the unfortunate situation created for plaintiffs like 
Jutrowski who are unable to identify their attackers through no 
fault of their own, we hold that a plaintiff alleging that one or 
more officers engaged in unconstitutional conduct must 
establish the “personal involvement” of each named defendant 
to survive summary judgment and take that defendant to trial. 
Nonetheless, where a plaintiff adduces sufficient evidence of 
an after-the-fact conspiracy to cover up misconduct, even of an 
unidentified officer, he may be able to state a claim under 
§ 1983 for the violation of a different constitutional right: the 
due process right of access to the courts. Such is the case here. 
Accordingly, we will affirm the District Court as to Jutrowski’s 
excessive force claim but will reverse and remand as to his 
conspiracy claim. 
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I. Background 
A. Factual Background1 
On June 23, 2010, Emil Jutrowski, after drinking 
several vodka sodas at a bar in East Hanover, NJ, crashed his 
sport utility vehicle along the shoulder of the highway. Other 
than a small cut above his right eye, Jutrowski suffered no 
injuries from the accident. Because his car was pinned up 
against the left guardrail, however, he could not exit from the 
driver’s side door and was still attempting to “pull away” when 
police arrived. App. 285. The first two officers to arrive on the 
scene were Officer Travis Roemmele and Officer Christopher 
Biro of the Riverdale, New Jersey Police Department (the 
“Riverdale Defendants”). Moments later, three State Troopers 
arrived, including Appellees Jeffrey Heimbach and James 
Franchino (the “State Trooper Defendants”).  
 
The officers quickly deduced that Jutrowski was heavily 
intoxicated. Heimbach, who first approached Jutrowski, 
immediately detected “an overwhelming odor of an alcoholic 
beverage emanating from the interior of [the] vehicle,” and 
asked Jutrowski to produce his license and registration. 
App. 285. Instead, Jutrowski attempted to light a cigarette and 
                                              
1 The factual summary below draws from record 
evidence and because the District Court granted summary 
judgment in the defendants’ favor, we view the facts in the light 
most favorable to Jutrowski. See, e.g., Pellegrino v. U.S. 
Transp. Sec. Admin, No. 15-3047, 2018 WL 3371699, at *2 n.2 
(3d Cir. 2018).  
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proceeded to rub liquid hand sanitizer on his face.2 As the smell 
of alcohol became “stronger,” Heimbach determined that “it 
was emanating directly from [Jutrowski’s] breath.” App. 285. 
He also observed that Jutrowski’s eyes were bloodshot and his 
pupils extremely dilated, and that, although Jutrowski was still 
seated in his vehicle, he was disoriented and moving slowly. 
Id.3  
It was also apparent that Jutrowski needed medical 
attention. Heimbach noticed the cut above his right eye, and 
Jutrowski told Heimbach that he was injured, that he had a 
heart condition, and that he wanted to go to the hospital. Soon 
after, emergency medical personnel arrived and administered 
first aid while Jutrowski remained seated in his SUV. At the 
point Jutrowski verbally refused further medical treatment but 
also refused to sign a written waiver of further treatment, 
Heimbach asked Jutrowski to exit his vehicle. Jutrowski 
initially refused but eventually, because the driver’s side door 
was inoperable, he climbed over the seat and exited the 
passenger door without assistance. The officers acquiesced to 
Jutrowski’s request not to be handcuffed on account of his 
heart condition, and Troopers Heimbach and Franchino began 
escorting him towards the ambulance on the other side of the 
highway. Jutrowski, however, was unsteady on his feet and 
                                              
2 According to the officers, Jutrowski took “liquid hand 
sanitizer and rubbed it all over his face and head and attempted 
to swallow s[o]me.” App. 285. Jutrowski testified that he was 
merely trying to apply hand sanitizer to the gash over his eye. 
3 Under the circumstances, Heimbach normally would 
have performed a field sobriety test, but he declined to do so 
on account of Jutrowski’s injuries. 
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wobbled, so Trooper Franchino, concerned about “the roadway 
conditions and the proximity to traffic,” reached out for 
Jutrowski’s right wrist to steady him.4 App. 281. In reaction, 
Jutrowski “pulled his hand away in an upward fashion, 
subsequently striking [Franchino] in the forehead with his 
forearm,” App. 281, and Franchino, in turn, promptly executed 
a “front leg sweep” maneuver that took Jutrowski to the 
ground, App. 281, 424. Jutrowski fell “straight ahead,” 
App. 425, with “some force,” App. 426, and “just kind of face-
planted, just like a tower falling over,” App. 336.  
 
 Lying on the ground on his stomach, Jutrowski’s face 
was turned to his right, with his left cheek on the pavement. 
With Troopers Franchino and Heimbach on Jutrowski’s right 
side and a third trooper on his left, the officers attempted to 
handcuff him—a difficult task because Jutrowski’s hands were 
tucked underneath him and he was a “very strong, very big 
man,” allegedly weighing over 300 pounds at the time. 
App. 375, 427, 462. As Franchino used his baton to pry 
Jutrowski’s arms from underneath him, Riverdale Officers 
Biro and Roemmele ran over to assist. Biro knelt down at 
Jutrowski’s feet to hold his legs, and Roemmele “assisted by 
holding [Jutrowski’s] legs while the officers were finally able 
to remove [his] hands from under his body.” App. 288. 
Heimbach put his knee in the small of Jutrowski’s back to 
subdue him and with Jutrowski still lying face down, 
                                              
4 Jutrowski testified he was unsteady because he was 
struck in the crotch by the stick shift when he climbed out of 
the car and was therefore in severe pain, but Trooper Franchino 
testified that Jutrowski was “stumbling and kind of staggering 
. . . walking closer to the lane of traffic.” App. 435. 
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Heimbach began to search him. Franchino was positioned near 
Jutrowski’s shoulders, and was thus “closest to his head.” App. 
438. 
 
At some point in the midst of this scuffle, one of the 
officers kicked Jutrowski hard on the right side of his face,5 
hard enough to inflict a “blow out fracture,” that is, a broken 
nose and broken eye socket, requiring surgery. App. 262–63.6 
 
After the kick, the officers turned Jutrowski over on his 
back and Trooper Heimbach continued searching him. As 
Heimbach was patting him down, however, Jutrowski 
“kick[ed] his left leg up striking . . . Trooper [Heimbach] in the 
face with his left foot.” App. 288. At that point, Jutrowski was 
handcuffed and taken to the hospital. He ultimately pleaded 
guilty to driving under the influence. 
                                              
5 On appeal, the State Trooper Defendants concede that 
Jutrowski was kicked, see State Trooper Br. 5. While the 
Riverdale Defendants do not make this concession as 
explicitly, they “d[id] not contest that Plaintiff was kicked” 
before the District Court, App. 24, nor do they on appeal, see 
Riverdale Br. 12.  
6 A medical expert report indicates that it is unlikely 
Jutrowski’s injury was the “result merely from a fall face first,” 
but instead that it “would take either a kick or punch of 
significant force to create the type” of injuries he suffered. 
App. 262–62. To this day, Jutrowski’s injury causes him pain, 
and he suffers from “frequent headaches, vertigo, dizziness, 
vision problems, sinusitis, difficult concentrating, [and] 
discharge from his nose . . . .” Appellant’s Br. 7. 
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B. Procedural History 
Because he was unable to identify which of the officers 
in his immediate vicinity was the one that kicked him, 
Jutrowski filed suit against Officers Biro and Roemmele and 
Troopers Franchino and Heimbach, along with the Township 
of Riverdale and State of New Jersey (collectively, the 
“Defendants”).7 His complaint, as relevant here, included in 
Count I a claim for the use of excessive force, in violation of 
the Fourth Amendment and 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and, in Counts 
V and VI, claims of conspiracy, in violation of § 1983 and New 
Jersey law, respectively, to violate federal and state civil rights 
by using excessive force, by filing false and misleading police 
reports, and by giving misleading grand jury testimony.8 
                                              
7 The operative complaint here was originally filed in 
state court and was removed by Defendants to the District 
Court. Emil Jutrowski v. Township of Riverdale, et al., No. 13-
7351, 2017 WL 1395484, at *3 (D.N.J. Apr. 17, 2017). 
8 All told, Jutrowski’s complaint included seven counts: 
(I) a § 1983 claim for excessive force (against the Individual 
Defendants); (II) a § 1983 claim for failure to properly train, 
supervise and control officers (against the police departments); 
(III) a state law tort claim for excessive force, assault and 
battery (against all Defendants); (IV) a state law tort claim for 
failure to properly train, supervise and control officers (against 
the police departments); (V) an alleged conspiracy to violate 
federal civil rights (against the Individual Defendants); (VI) an 
alleged conspiracy to violate state civil rights (against the 
Individual Defendants); and (VII) a claim for assault and 
battery (against the Individual Defendants). Counts II, III, IV, 
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After Defendants unsuccessfully moved for dismissal, 
the case proceeded to discovery, where it was established that 
Biro, Roemmele, Franchino, and Heimbach were each in 
Jutrowski’s immediate presence when he was kicked. But 
Jutrowski was not able in the course of the discovery to identify 
which of these law enforcement officers inflicted the blow, and 
none of the officers admitted to being either the perpetrator or 
a witness. Even Heimbach—who testified that he had his knee 
in Jutrowski’s back between his shoulder blades, that his “sole 
focus” for “the entire time” was on Jutrowski’s head, and that 
“if anything . . . struck [Jutrowski] in the face, he would 
know”—allegedly saw nothing. App. 344. Likewise, Trooper 
Franchino testified that he was the officer “closest to 
[Jutrowski’s] head” and was “more than six inches [but] less 
than three feet” away when Jutrowski was taken to the ground, 
but he too saw nothing. App. 438.  
 
Nor did any of the dashboard cameras (“dashcams”) on 
the officers’ vehicles capture the incident. Officer Biro’s car 
was parked closest to Jutrowski’s, and his dashcam presumably 
would have had the best view of Jutrowski being escorted from 
his car across the highway—except that it allegedly did not 
record. According to Biro’s testimony, he did not manually 
switch on the camera because he believed he was pulling over 
to investigate a traffic accident, not to effectuate a vehicle stop. 
Emil Jutrowski v. Township of Riverdale, et al., No. 13-7351, 
2017 WL 1395484, at *1 (D.N.J. Apr. 17, 2017). Biro also 
                                              
and VII are not at issue as Jutrowski does not challenge the 
District Court’s entry of summary judgment on those counts on 
appeal. Jutrowski, 2017 WL 1395474, at *6–7. 
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indicated that the camera should record automatically when the 
emergency lights are activated, as they were here, but his 
testimony was ambiguous as to whether that was true at the 
time of the incident or was a more recent development, and 
Jutrowski’s counsel did not seek clarification. For their part, 
the State Troopers’ dashcams were activated but “did not 
capture any of the critical alleged events” due to their poor 
vantage points. Id. 
 
In the absence of evidence identifying the perpetrator, 
the District Court granted summary judgment on all counts for 
all Defendants. Id. As for the use of excessive force, although 
the Defendants “d[id] not contest that Plaintiff was kicked,” the 
District Court reasoned that because Jutrowski could not 
“identify which Defendant kicked him,” he was essentially 
asking “the Court to guess which individual Officer Defendant 
committed the alleged wrong.” Id. at *4. In its thorough and 
thoughtful opinions granting summary judgment and denying 
reconsideration, the District Court relied on this Court’s 
precedents to conclude that absent an “evidentiary basis on 
which to hold” any individual defendant liable, Defendants 
were all entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Id. The District 
Court also rejected Jutrowski’s request to fill the evidentiary 
void with an adverse spoliation inference from the failure to 
produce Officer Biro’s dashcam video because Jutrowski had 
not made “a request for inspection pursuant to Federal Rule of 
Civil Procedure 34(a)” or taken other steps to obtain evidence 
of the video, and thus he failed “to provide sufficient evidence 
demonstrating that the video actually existed.” Id. at *5. 
 
As for the federal and state civil conspiracy counts, the 
District Court found “no facts suggesting that [Individual] 
Defendants spoke to each other concerning the alleged kick 
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before the incident occurred” and that it could not infer any 
“after-the-fact” conspiracy because Jutrowski had not 
identified specific facts to support the contention “that the 
officers from Riverdale and the State Police colluded before 
writing their reports or testifying before the grand jury.” Id. at 
*8. It therefore granted summary judgment on these counts, 
both to the extent they asserted a conspiracy to use excessive 
force and to the extent they asserted a conspiracy to violate 
Jutrowski’s rights afterwards. 
 
Jutrowski now appeals, arguing that the District Court 
erred in granting summary judgment on his claims of excessive 
force and civil conspiracy.  
II. Jurisdiction and Standard of Review9 
We review the District Court’s grant of summary 
judgment de novo. Faush v. Tuesday Morning, Inc., 808 F.3d 
208, 215 (3d Cir. 2015). To warrant summary judgment, the 
moving party must establish “that there is no genuine dispute 
as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment 
as a matter of law,” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a), and all facts should 
be viewed “in the light most favorable to the non-moving 
party,” with “all reasonable inferences [drawn] in that party’s 
favor,” Scheidemantle v. Slippery Rock Univ. State Sys. of 
Higher Educ., 470 F.3d 535, 538 (3d Cir. 2006). For its part, 
“[t]he non-moving party must oppose the motion and, in doing 
so, may not rest upon the mere allegations or denials of his 
pleadings” but, instead, “must set forth specific facts showing 
that there is a genuine issue for trial. Bare assertions, 
                                              
9 The District Court had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. 
§ 1331; we have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  
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conclusory allegations, or suspicions will not suffice.” D.E. v. 
Central Dauphin School Dist., 765 F.3d 260, 268–69 (3d Cir. 
2014) (citations omitted).  
 
A factual dispute is genuine “if the evidence is such that 
a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving 
party,” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 
(1986), but “[c]onversely, where a non-moving party fails 
sufficiently to establish the existence of an essential element of 
its case on which it bears the burden of proof at trial, there is 
not a genuine dispute with respect to a material fact and thus 
the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” 
Goldenstein v. Repossessors Inc., 815 F.3d 142, 146 (citations 
omitted). 
 
We review the denial of an adverse spoliation inference 
for abuse of discretion. In re Hechinger Inv. Co. of Del., 489 
F. 3d 568, 574 (3d Cir. 2007). A district court abuses its 
discretion if its decision not to draw the inference rests upon “a 
clearly erroneous finding of fact, an errant conclusion of law 
or an improper application of law to fact.” Meditz v. City of 
Newark, 658 F.3d 364, 367 n.1 (3d Cir. 2011) (citations 
omitted). 
 
III. Discussion 
On appeal, Jutrowski argues that the District Court erred 
by granting summary judgment on his excessive force claim 
against all Defendants because he set forth specific facts 
showing a genuine issue for trial in two ways: by establishing 
that excessive force was used and that the Individual 
Defendants were all in close proximity, and by adducing 
sufficient evidence (the absence of a dashcam video from 
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Officer Biro) to warrant an adverse inference against the 
Defendants. He also claims error in the grant of summary 
judgment on his claims against the Individual Defendants for 
conspiracy to violate his federal and state civil rights. We 
address these arguments in turn. 
 
A. The Excessive Force Claim 
As Jutrowski would have it, so long as a plaintiff can 
show that some officer used excessive force, he may haul 
before a jury all officers who were “in the immediate vicinity 
of where excessive force occurred” without any proof of their 
personal involvement. Appellant’s Br. 13. That is simply not 
the law. Instead, the tenet that a defendant’s § 1983 liability 
must be predicated on his direct and personal involvement in 
the alleged violation has deep historical roots in tort law 
principles, is manifest in our excessive force jurisprudence, 
and is reinforced by persuasive authority from our Sister 
Circuits. 
 
We begin with principles of tort liability, which 
necessarily inform our interpretation of § 1983 as a statute 
“sounding in tort.” Howell v. Cataldi, 464 F.2d 272, 278 n.10 
(3d Cir. 1972); see Carey v. Piphus, 435 U.S. 247, 253 (1978) 
(describing § 1983 as a “species of tort liability”). As the 
Supreme Court has long recognized, a fundamental principle is 
that a tortfeasor’s “liability . . . will only result from his own 
neglect . . . .” Dunlop v. Munroe, 11 U.S. 242, 269 (1812). That 
is because “[o]ur system of private liability for the 
consequences of a man’s own acts . . . started from the notion 
of actual intent and actual personal culpability.” Oliver 
Wendell Holmes, Jr., The Common Law 4 (Boston, Little, 
Brown, & Co. 1881). And, as a result, “[a]n essential element 
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of [a] plaintiff’s cause of action for negligence, or for that 
matter for any other tort, is that there be some reasonable 
connection between the act or omission of the defendant and 
the damage which the plaintiff has suffered.” W. Page Keeton 
et al., Prosser and Keeton on Torts 263 (5th ed., 1984); see 
also Restatement (Second) of Torts § 430 (1965). 
  
In the § 1983 context, these principles have led the 
Supreme Court to require a “showing of direct responsibility” 
by the named defendant and to eschew any “theory of liability” 
in which defendants played “no affirmative part in depriving 
any[one] . . . of any constitutional rights,” Rizzo v. Goode, 423 
U.S. 362, 376–77 (1976)—including theories of vicarious or 
respondeat superior liability, see Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 
662, 676 (2009); see also Merklin v. United States, 788 F.2d 
172, 175 (3d Cir. 1986). Instead, “[b]ecause vicarious liability 
is inapplicable to . . . § 1983 suits, a plaintiff must plead that 
each Government-official defendant, through the official’s 
own individual actions, has violated the Constitution.” Iqbal, 
556 U.S. at 676 (emphasis added). “Each Government official, 
his or her title notwithstanding, is only liable for his or her own 
misconduct.” Id. at 677 (emphasis added). And, a fortiori, if 
entities and supervisors may not be vicariously liable under 
§ 1983 for the constitutional violation of a given individual, 
neither may that individual’s cohorts who happen to be in the 
immediate vicinity. See Anela v. City of Wildwood, 790 F.2d 
1063, 1067–68 (3d Cir. 1986) (observing that defendants may 
“not be held liable under section 1983 merely because they 
were members of a group of which some other members were 
guilty of abuses” (citing Rizzo, 423 U.S. at 370–71)). 
 
We have imported these precepts into the excessive 
force context in a trilogy of cases that squarely foreclose 
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Jutrowski’s argument today. In Howell, 464 F.2d 272, where 
the plaintiff alleged that a single police officer exerted 
excessive force in arresting him and sued two of the six officers 
at the scene, alleging that one was the perpetrator, we affirmed 
a directed verdict for the defendants because “[i]nsofar as the 
two defendants are concerned, one of them is free of liability.” 
Id. at 283. “At best,” we explained, “there was proof of 
wrongful conduct of one, identified only as one of two possible 
actors, without an explicit identification as to which of the 
two,” and thus, “without more,” there was no way to know 
which of them should be held to answer for the violation. Id. at 
283. 
 
In Sharrar v. Felsing, 128 F.3d 810 (3d Cir. 1997), 
where the plaintiff alleged that an officer who handcuffed him 
had dislocated his shoulder but could not identify which, out of 
the 20 officers on the scene, was the perpetrator, we likewise 
concluded that there was “no evidentiary basis on which to 
hold the[] defendants liable” and affirmed the order of 
summary judgment in their favor on that basis. Id. at 821. 
 
In contrast, in Smith v. Mensinger, 293 F.3d 641 (3d Cir. 
2002), we reversed the grant of summary judgment on an 
Eighth Amendment claim where, although the plaintiff-inmate 
conceded he could not see all five of the defendant-correctional 
officers during his alleged beating, he testified that “all of them 
. . . were pushing my head, right, into the cabinets . . . and 
walls,” and “the full force of all the guards [was] behind me . 
. . . I said all of them.” Id. at 650 (emphasis omitted). In that 
circumstance, we explained, the “fact that Smith . . . 
acknowledged that he could not see those defendants during 
the beating neither negate[d] their involvement nor their 
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liability as a matter of law.”10 Id. Thus, Smith ultimately 
involved nothing more than a dispute about “[t]he extent of 
each officer’s participation,” which “is . . . a classic factual 
dispute to be resolved by the fact finder,” id. (emphasis added), 
while Howell and Sharrar involved a dispute about the 
possibility of each officer’s participation, which we held is 
insufficient, “without more,” Howell, 464 F.2d at 282; see 
Sharrar, 128 F.3d at 821, to reach a jury and entitles defendants 
to judgment as a matter of law. 
 
The line we drew in these cases is consistent with the 
approach of other Courts of Appeals. Indeed, just last year, our 
colleagues on the Seventh Circuit wrestled with the “potential 
tension” between the individual-responsibility requirement of 
§ 1983 and “factual scenarios . . . [where] [i]t may be 
problematic to require plaintiffs to specifically identify which 
officers” committed the constitutional violation. Colbert v. 
City of Chicago, 851 F.3d 649, 657–58 (7th Cir. 2017), cert. 
denied sub nom. Colbert v. City of Chicago, Ill., 138 S. Ct. 657 
(2018). In that case, the plaintiff sued four of the ten officers 
who searched his bedroom, causing property damage, though 
he “admitted that he was unable to identify which of the ten 
                                              
10 Jutrowski focuses on other language in Smith—
specifically, our observation that “it is undisputed that all of 
the named officers were in the vicinity at some point when 
Smith alleges he was beaten,” id. at 651—to argue that mere 
presence creates “a sufficient issue of material fact to deny . . . 
summary judgment,” Appellant’s Br. 18, but in context, this 
merely indicated there was objective corroboration for the 
plaintiff’s testimony that “all of them” were involved, Smith, 
293 F.3d at 650.  
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searching officers had caused the alleged property damage 
because he was not allowed in the rooms while the officers 
conducted their search.” Id. at 657. Despite the “acceptable 
reasons” for the officers to clear the search area which risked 
“effectively immunizing officers from property-damage 
claims by preventing a plaintiff from observing the person 
responsible for the damage,” the court held that the plaintiff 
was “unable to satisfy § 1983’s personal-responsibility 
requirement at summary judgment.” Id. at 657–68. At the same 
time, it observed that plaintiffs in this situation might have 
recourse “by including in their complaint allegations of 
misconduct that are unaffected at summary judgment by the 
inability to observe the search,” such as “a ‘conspiracy of 
silence among the officers’ in which defendants refuse to 
disclose which of their number has injured the plaintiff.” Id. 
(citations omitted). 
 
Other Courts of Appeals likewise have held that 
personal involvement of each defendant is a prerequisite to 
liability in § 1983 cases. See, e.g., Burley v. Gagacki, 729 F.3d 
610, 619 (6th Cir. 2013) (“To establish liability against an 
individual defendant acting under color of state law, a plaintiff 
must show that the defendant was ‘personally involved’ in the 
use of excessive force.”); Dodds v. Richardson, 614 F.3d 1185, 
1195 (10th Cir. 2010) (“[I]ndividual liability under § 1983 
must be based on personal involvement in the alleged 
constitutional violation.”) (citations omitted); see also Jones v. 
Williams, 297 F.3d 930, 935 (9th Cir. 2002) (“[A] plaintiff 
could not hold an officer liable because of his membership in 
a group without a showing of individual participation in the 
unlawful conduct.”). 
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The authorities on which we rely—tort law principles 
informing § 1983 liability, our own precedent, and the wisdom 
of our Sister Circuits—are thus unanimous that, in the face of 
motion for summary judgment, a § 1983 plaintiff must produce 
evidence supporting each individual defendant’s personal 
involvement in the alleged violation to bring that defendant to 
trial. But Jutrowski has not done so: As he concedes, after 
significant discovery, he has narrowed the potential universe 
of actors to those that were in his immediate vicinity, but he 
filed suit against only four of the five of them and still cannot 
“identify the actor that kicked him.” Appellant’s Br. 12. Put 
another way, he admittedly seeks to proceed to trial against at 
least three defendants who are “free of liability,” Howell, 464 
F.2d at 283, without any “ascertainment of [which] individual 
charged was the perpetrator of the constitutional deprivation,” 
id. at 282. As the foregoing discussion teaches, that is not a 
sufficient basis to survive summary judgment. 
 
Nor is that deficiency remedied by the potential adverse 
inference Jutrowski contends should be drawn from Officer 
Biro’s failure to produce his dashcam video. At summary 
judgment, “the trier of fact generally may receive the fact of . . 
. nonproduction or destruction [of relevant materials] as 
evidence that the party that has prevented production did so out 
of the well-founded fear that the contents would harm him,” 
see Brewer v. Quaker State Oil Refining Corp., 72 F.3d 326, 
334 (3d Cir. 1995). But a spoliation inference requires, among 
other things, “actual suppression or withholding of evidence,” 
Bull v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 665 F.3d 68, 73 (3d Cir. 
2012), and here, the District Court found, it would have to 
“assume[] there was a recording of the incident” because 
Jutrowski “fail[ed] to provide sufficient evidence 
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demonstrating that the video actually existed.” Jutrowski, 2017 
WL 1395474, at *5. 
 
That evidence is indeed starkly absent. On appeal, as at 
summary judgment, Jutrowski posits the existence of an 
automatic recording based entirely on Biro’s statement at his 
deposition that the recording device “activates with [the 
emergency] lights.” App. 396. This statement, however, was in 
the present tense, while moments later, Biro made cryptic 
reference to events “back then” and a “different system.” Id. 
Yet Jutrowski neither asked follow-up questions at that point,11 
nor sought afterwards to confirm the existence of the video 
through “a request for inspection pursuant to Federal Rule of 
                                              
11 Jutrowski’s counsel did not seek to clarify, for 
example, whether Biro’s dashcam was programmed at the time 
of the incident to automatically record upon activation of 
emergency lights or that was only a more recent development; 
whether there were circumstances in which the dashcam would 
not automatically record with the lights activated; whether it 
recorded with the lights activated at other stops that day; or 
whether he had filed any report concerning a malfunction. Nor 
does the record on appeal reflect any interrogatories or requests 
for admission to this effect. Moreover, we have held that “[n]o 
unfavorable inference” is warranted “when the circumstances 
indicate” that the failure to turn over the relevant evidence is 
“otherwise properly accounted for,” Brewer, 72 F.3d at 334, 
and Biro “accounted for” his failure to manually record the 
events, testifying that he “wasn’t thinking” about “go[ing] back 
to [his] car to hit a button” and that he was not required to do 
so because he initially considered the incident only as a motor 
vehicle accident. App. 396. 
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Civil Procedure 34(a)” or other discovery devices. Jutrowski, 
2017 WL 1395474, at *5. Having failed to establish the 
existence of the video, Jutrowski necessarily failed to show it 
was “actual[ly] suppress[ed].” Bull, 665 F.3d at 73. Thus, 
whatever inferences a reasonable jury might draw from the 
absence of this dashcam footage at trial, see infra Section III.B, 
the District Court’s refusal to draw an adverse inference at 
summary judgment was not an abuse of discretion.  
 
The upshot is a record insufficient for any reasonable 
jury to identify which, if any,12 of the Individual Defendants 
used excessive force. Jutrowski does not contend that all them 
kicked him, only that one did; he does not purport to raise a 
dispute about the extent of each officer’s participation, but 
rather the possibility of it; and what he tenders to fill the 
evidentiary gap—an adverse inference to be drawn from the 
absence of a dashcam video—itself lacks support in the record. 
Laid bare, Jutrowski’s argument is that “an issue of material 
fact as to the identity of the Appellee that kicked,” Appellant’s 
Br. 13, is sufficient to reach a jury, and even if it is not under 
Howell, Sharrar, and Smith, it should be. But in view of those 
cases, the District Court correctly concluded that all 
Defendants were entitled to summary judgment on Count I of 
the complaint. And, though we share the concern expressed by 
the Seventh Circuit in Colbert that our holding could 
“effectively immunize” perpetrators of constitutional 
violations who successfully “prevent[] a plaintiff from 
observing the person responsible for” the harm, 851 F.3d at 
                                              
12 The third State Trooper in the immediate vicinity 
when Jutrowski was being arrested was not named as a 
defendant. 
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657–78, ours is not to break from controlling Circuit 
precedent.13 
 
As the Colbert court also observed, however, there may 
be other “avenue[s] for relief,” like a conspiracy claim, that 
“sufficiently construct[] the necessary causal connection 
between the official and some wrongdoing, regardless of 
whether the plaintiff was able to observe” the constitutional 
violation. See Colbert, 851 F.3d at 658. It is to such a claim 
that we now turn. 
 
B. The Conspiracy Claims Against the Individual 
Defendants 
In his complaint, Jutrowski alleges both a conspiracy to 
violate his federal civil rights, in violation of § 1983 (Count V), 
and a conspiracy to violate his state civil rights, in violation of 
New Jersey law (Count VI). Tracking each other nearly 
verbatim, each of those Counts pleads two distinct conspiracies 
among the Individual Defendants: one before he was kicked, 
to arrest him using excessive force, and another after the fact, 
to cover up the use of that force.14 We agree with the District 
                                              
13 “[I]t is the tradition of this court that the holding of a 
panel in a precedential opinion is binding on subsequent 
panels,” Joyce v. Maersk Line Ltd, 876 F.3d 502, 508 (2017) 
(en banc), and we are not free to overrule a prior precedential 
opinion absent en banc hearing, see Reilly v. City of 
Harrisburg, 858 F.3d 173, 177 (3d Cir. 2017); 3d Cir. I.O.P. 
9.1. 
14 Unlike in a criminal indictment, where charging 
multiple conspiracies in the same count is forbidden by the 
doctrine of duplicity, U.S. v. Morrow, 717 F.3d 800, 804 (3d 
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Court that Jutrowski did not proffer sufficient evidence to 
create a triable issue of fact as to whether the officers “reached 
an[y] illicit agreement prior to the alleged kick.” Jutrowski, 
2017 WL 1395474, at *8. For the reasons explained below, 
however, we cannot agree that he failed to raise a fact issue 
concerning “a conspiracy . . . to violate [his] constitutional 
rights through after-the-fact evidence.” Id. 
 
i.  Requirements to Establish a § 1983 
Conspiracy 
To prevail on a conspiracy claim under § 1983, a 
plaintiff must prove that persons acting under color of state law 
“reached an understanding” to deprive him of his constitutional 
rights. Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 150-52 
(1970).15 Such rights include, of course, those protected by the 
                                              
Cir. 1983), multiple conspiracies may be charged in a single 
count of a civil complaint. See, e.g., Hampton v. Hanrahan, 
600 F.2d 600, 621, 627 n.27 (7th Cir. 1979), rev’d in part on 
other grounds by Hanrahan v. Hampton, 466 U.S. 754 (1980). 
That is because, in the civil context, “[f]ederal pleading rules 
call for ‘a short and plain statement of the claim showing that 
the pleader is entitled to relief,’ Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 8(a)(2); 
they do not countenance dismissal of a complaint for imperfect 
statement of the legal theory supporting the claim asserted.” 
Johnson v. City of Shelby, Miss., 135 S. Ct. 346, 346 (2014). 
Jutrowski’s conspiracy claims meet this standard. 
 
15 The elements of a claim of conspiracy to violate 
federal civil rights are that “(1) two or more persons conspire 
to deprive any person of [constitutional rights]; (2) one or more 
of the conspirators performs . . . any overt act in furtherance of 
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Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, such as the 
“right to be heard in an impartial forum,” Great W. Mining & 
Mineral Co. v. Fox Rothschild LLP, 615 F.3d 159, 161 (3d Cir. 
2010), and the “right of access to the courts,” Monroe v. Beard, 
536 F.3d 198, 205 (3d Cir. 2008).16 Those rights “assure[] that 
no person will be denied the opportunity to present to the 
judiciary allegations concerning violations of . . . constitutional 
rights.” Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 579 (1974). 
                                              
the conspiracy; and (3) that overt act injures the plaintiff in his 
person or property or deprives the plaintiff of any right or 
privilege of a citizen of the United States,” with the added gloss 
under § 1983 that “the conspirators act ‘under the color of state 
law.’” Barnes Foundation v. Township of Lower Merion, 242 
F.3d 151, 162 (3d Cir. 2001) (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 1983). 
Under New Jersey law, the elements of a claim of conspiracy 
to violate civil rights are essentially the same. See Banco 
Popular N.A. v. Gandi 184 N.J. 161, 177-78 (2005) (“In New 
Jersey . . . the principal element of [civil conspiracy] is 
agreement between parties to inflict wrong against or injury 
upon another, and an overt act that results in damage.”) 
(citations omitted). Thus, although we focus our discussion 
below on Jutrowski’s § 1983 conspiracy claims, their 
resolution also dictates our disposition of his state conspiracy 
claims. 
16 See Marshall v. Jerrico, Inc., 446 U.S. 238, 242 
(1980) (observing that “[t]he Due Process Clause entitles a 
person to an impartial and disinterested tribunal in both civil 
and criminal cases”); Bounds v. Smith, 430 U.S. 817, 828 
(1977) (describing access to the courts as a “fundamental 
constitutional right”). 
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Although deprivations of the right of access to the 
courts arise most often in the prison context,17 see, e.g., 
Peterkin v. Jeffes, 855 F.2d 1021, 1036 (3d Cir. 1988), this 
right is also denied when law enforcement officers conspire to 
cover up constitutional violations, see, e.g., Colbert, 851 F.3d 
at 657–58 (holding that the plaintiff could allege under § 1983 
that “the named officers participated in something akin to a 
‘conspiracy of silence among the officers’ in which defendants 
refuse to disclose which of their number has injured the 
plaintiff”). A “conspiracy of silence” among officers is 
actionable as a § 1983 conspiracy because the coordinated 
officer conduct “impede[s] an individual’s access to courts ” 
and renders “hollow” a victim’s right to redress in a court of 
law. Vasquez v. Hernandez, 60 F.3d 325, 328–29 (7th Cir. 
1995) (“[W]hen police officers conceal or obscure important 
facts about a crime from its victims rendering hollow the right 
to seek redress, constitutional rights are undoubtedly 
abridged.”); see also Swiggett v. Upper Merion Twp., No. 08-
2604, 2008 WL 4916039, at *4 (E.D. Pa. Nov. 17, 2008) 
(“[C]ourts have found that concealing a constitutional 
violation, including use of excessive force, does not amount to 
                                              
17 The right of access to the courts is sourced from both 
“the First and Fourteenth Amendments,” Monroe, 536 F.3d at 
205, and is typically framed as a due process right in the inmate 
context, see id. at 209, but in other contexts as “an aspect of the 
First Amendment right to petition the Government for redress 
of grievances,” Bill Johnson’s Rests., Inc. v. NLRB, 461 U.S. 
731, 741 (1983); but see Pennsylvania v. Finley, 481 U.S. 551, 
557 (1987) (describing the right to “meaningful access” to the 
courts as an “equal protection guarantee”). 
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a separate constitutional violation unless the victim of the 
concealment was deprived of his right of access to the 
courts.”). 
 
After a plaintiff establishes that the object of the 
conspiracy was the deprivation of a federally protected right, 
“the rule is clear that” the plaintiff “must provide some factual 
basis to support the existence of the elements of a conspiracy: 
agreement and concerted action.” Capogrosso v. Supreme 
Court of N.J., 588 F.3d 180, 184–85 (3d Cir. 2009) (citing 
Crabtree v. Muchmore, 904 F.2d 1475, 1481 (10th Cir. 1990)). 
To show agreement, he must demonstrate that “the state actors 
named as defendants in the[] complaint somehow reached an 
understanding to deny [the plaintiff] his rights,” Kost v. 
Kozakiewicz, 1 F.3d 176, 185 (3d Cir. 1993), and in the absence 
of direct proof, that “meeting of the minds” or “understanding 
or agreement to conspire” can be “infer[red]” from 
circumstantial evidence, Startzell v. City of Philadelphia, 533 
F.3d 183, 205 (3d Cir. 2008). Such circumstantial evidence 
may include that the alleged conspirators “did or said 
something . . . to create an understanding,” “the approximate 
time when the agreement was made, the specific parties to the 
agreement[,] the period of the conspiracy, or the object of the 
conspiracy.” Great W. Mining, 615 F.3d at 178–79 (citations 
omitted). And in the context of an alleged conspiracy among 
police officers, it may manifest as “conversations” between 
officers about the incident, “allegedly distorted” stories that 
“emerged,” an “awareness of conflicting stories” and 
“irregularities in the series of official investigations” into the 
incident. Hampton v. Hanrahan, 600 F.2d 600, 627–28 (7th 
Cir. 1979), rev’d in part on other grounds by Hanrahan v. 
Hampton, 466 U.S. 754 (1980). 
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Because “inferring mental state from circumstantial 
evidence is among the chief tasks of factfinders,” Kedra v. 
Schroeter, 876 F.3d 424, 444 (3d Cir. 2017) (citing United 
States v. Wright, 665 F.3d 560, 569 (3d. Cir. 2012)), an 
allegation of conspiracy can only be overcome at summary 
judgment when “the moving parties’ submissions foreclose[] 
the possibility of the existence of certain facts from which ‘it 
would be open to a jury . . . to infer from the circumstances’ 
that there had been a meeting of the minds,” Anderson, 477 
U.S. at 249 (citing Adickes, 398 U.S. 144). 
 
ii.  The Conspiracy Claims Against the 
Individual Defendants 
 We dispense quickly with Jutrowski’s argument that he 
sufficiently established an agreement among the Individual 
Defendants, before the fact, to use excessive force. While this 
claim meets the threshold requirement that the alleged 
conspiracy had the goal of violating a constitutional right, 
Jutrowski’s assertion of a “common plan” among the officers, 
based on (1) an alleged “reloc[ation] [of] the ambulances so 
that EMT personnel would not be able to witness the[] attack,” 
and (2) the officers “simultaneously grabbing” him to take him 
down, is not supported by any specific facts in the record. App. 
276.18 To survive summary judgment, however, “specific facts 
                                              
18 With respect to the moving of the ambulances, the 
record is devoid of discovery from EMT personnel, and neither 
Jutrowski’s summary judgment opposition below nor his brief 
on appeal provide any record support for his allegations. Nor 
does the record support that the officers “simultaneously 
grabb[ed]” him to take him down. App. 276. Franchino, the 
officer who effectuated the take-down, testified that he was the 
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showing that there is a genuine issue for trial” are precisely 
what a plaintiff must show, and “[b]are assertions, conclusory 
allegations, or suspicions” will not suffice. D.E., 765 F.3d at 
268–69 (citations omitted). The District Court therefore did not 
err in granting summary judgment on Counts V and VI to the 
extent they allege before-the-fact conspiracies. 
 
The record paints a different picture, however, for 
Jutrowski’s claims of a conspiracy after the fact. As a threshold 
matter, we reject Defendants’ argument that Jutrowski failed to 
assert a cognizable conspiratorial objective because “[t]he only 
injur[y] [he] alleges is . . . to his eye” so that post-injury 
“actions with regard to [the officers’] paperwork and grand 
jury testimony cannot possibly form the basis of a conspiracy 
that led to [his] injuries.” State Troopers’ Br. 25. The “injury” 
Jutrowski asserts with respect to this conspiracy is not the 
application of excessive force but the denial of “access to the 
courts.” Monroe, 536 F.3d at 205. And drawing all reasonable 
inferences, as we must, in Jutrowski’s favor, we cannot agree 
with the District Court that there is insufficient evidence of 
                                              
“only . . . [one who] took [Jutrowski] to the ground,” App. 437, 
and that not all of the officer-defendants were even near 
Jutrowski when he executed the “front leg sweep” maneuver, 
App. 424. The testimony of other officers was consistent with 
that account. See, e.g., App. 396–97 (Roemmele testifying that 
he “was walking back” to his vehicle when Jutrowski was 
initially apprehended). Further, the deposition testimony 
shows that the takedown “happened instantly,” App. 335, after 
Jutrowski flailed his arm, making it implausible that there was 
time for a proverbial “meeting of the minds” before he was 
kicked moments later. 
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“collu[sion]” among “the officers from Riverdale and the State 
Police” to deprive him of that access. Jutrowski, 2017 WL 
1395474, at *8. 
 
For starters, material omissions in contemporaneous 
police reports can reasonably be seen by a jury as evidence that 
the officers “agreed to abide by [a] claim” about what 
happened and “agreed to represent [it] falsely,” Bell v. City of 
Milwaukee, 746 F.2d 1205, 1256 (7th Cir. 1984), rev’d on 
other grounds by Russ v. Watts, 413 F.3d 783 (7th Cir. 2005), 
and omissions specifically as to the infliction of an injury or 
“reference to the use of force” that indisputably occurred 
during an arrest “can be as dishonest as an outright lie,” United 
States v. Seymour, 472 F.3d 969, 970 (7th Cir. 2007) (finding 
the omission, in an arrest report, regarding the use of force 
against a jaywalker to be material because “[t]he test is whether 
what is omitted is something the intended reader would have 
expected to see included if it had occurred . . .”).  Here, none 
of the reports by Heimbach, Franchino or Roemmele19 
indicated that Jutrowski suffered significant injuries during the 
course of his arrest, yet several of the officers admitted in their 
depositions that Jutrowski’s injuries noticeably worsened 
during his apprehension.20 Moreover, notwithstanding the 
                                              
19 It appears that Biro did not prepare a separate report, 
as the one report produced by the Riverdale Police Department 
was prepared by Roemmele. The State Troopers produced 
three reports: a Supplemental Investigation Report and 
Reportable Use of Force report, both prepared by Franchino; 
and a Drinking Driving Report, prepared by Heimbach, 
20 See App. 338 (Heimbach testifying that after his 
arrest, Jutrowski’s “eye was a lot worse than the initial 
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District Court’s reasonable rejection of an adverse spoliation 
inference on the summary judgment record, a reasonable jury 
considering the inconsistent accounts of the vantage point from 
Biro’s vehicle21 and the absence of Biro’s dashcam footage 
when “all of the [other] automobiles on scene recorded the 
encounter and all recording[s] but Biro’s were produced,” 
Appellant’s Br. 23, might infer evidence of a cover-up.22 
 
Jutrowski’s after-the-fact conspiracy allegations also 
find support in the time that was available to reach an 
                                              
laceration”); App. 368, 380 (Roemmele testifying that before 
arrest, Jutrowski’s injury was a “[s]mall laceration; nothing 
major” but that afterwards his face looked “different” and it 
was “[s]wollen [with] more abrasions”); App. 402 (Biro 
testifying that after being taken to the ground, “there was blood 
on [Jutrowski’s] face, more than what he had”); App. 429 
(Franchino testifying that he does not “recall looking at 
[Jutrowski’s] face” but that he “would hope [to] notice[]” if the 
injuries had worsened). 
21 Biro testified in his deposition that he “kn[e]w [he] 
was either one or two cars behind” Jutrowski’s disabled SUV. 
App. 394. However, testimony from Heimbach, who arrived 
on the scene after Biro, as well as dashcam footage from 
Heimbach’s vehicle indicates that Biro was parked behind 
Jutrowski upon arrival. 
22 Decisions regarding the admissibility and admission 
of such evidence rest in the sound discretion of the District 
Court. See U.S. v. Finley, 726 F.3d 483, 491 (3d Cir. 2013) 
(noting that “[a] district court is generally afforded broad 
discretion on evidentiary rulings”).  
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agreement, see Great W. Mining, 615 F.3d at 178, and evidence 
of “conversations” between officers before the filing of reports, 
Hampton, 600 F.2d at 627. That is, there was undoubtedly time 
in the unhurried period after the incident and before the 
finalization of reports and deposition appearances for a 
“meeting of the minds,” Startzell, 533 F.3d at 205, and 
Heimbach acknowledged at his deposition that he “discussed” 
Jutrowski’s case with Franchino and the third trooper involved 
in the arrest “while . . . going over the reports,” and that “prior 
to writing the narrative report,” he “discussed [with them] 
everything that happened” concerning “the scene and the arrest 
and subduing of Mr. Jutrowski” in order to straighten out the 
“sequence of events,” App. 341. Franchino also testified that 
he “remember[ed] speaking about” Jutrowski’s injuries with 
Heimbach within a few weeks of the incident, App. 429, and 
that before submitting his report, it was “possible” that he 
discussed the “facts of the case” with Heimbach, App. 431. 
  
Moreover, what emerged from these conversations 
might well be viewed by a reasonable jury as “irregularities” 
and “distorted” or “conflicting” accounts that suggest “a 
concerted effort to suppress facts.” Hampton, 600 F.2d at 628. 
For example, Roemmele’s report, the lone Riverdale Police 
report as none was produced by Biro, makes reference to the 
presence of State Troopers, but it does not mention the 
presence of Biro, who not only participated in the arrest but 
was also Roemmele’s supervisor. Heimbach’s report omits any 
reference to the use of excessive force, although he does not 
dispute that someone kicked Jutrowski and that his “sole 
focus” for “the entire time” was on Jutrowski’s head, so that 
“if any[one] . . . struck [Jutrowski] in the face, [he] would 
[have] know[n].” App. 344. For his part, Trooper Franchino 
testified that he was the officer “closest to [Jutrowski’s] head,” 
 33 
and was “less than three feet” away when Jutrowski was taken 
to the ground, App. 438, but professed that he did not ever 
“look[] at [Jutrowski’s] face,” App. 432, and that he checked 
the box for “moderate injury” on his use of force report only 
because “possib[ly] someone told” him to do it, App. 434. The 
Riverdale officers, who were also in Jutrowski’s immediate 
vicinity, likewise do not contest that a kick occurred, but 
Roemmele made no reference to it in the one report produced 
by the Riverdale Police Department, and both officers contend 
that they did not see it. Furthermore, all of this may be 
considered against the backdrop of the other evidence in the 
record on summary judgment, including the report of a medical 
expert, who averred that Jutrowski’s injury most likely resulted 
from “either a kick or punch of significant force.” App. 263. 
 
In short, what Jutrowski put forward concerning alleged 
federal and state conspiracies to deprive him of access to the 
courts was sufficient to create a genuine issue of material fact. 
And he did so, consistent with Smith, for each of the Individual 
Defendants. That is, Jutrowski alleged that “all” of “Defendant 
officers . . . did act together and in concert” to conspire to 
violate his civil rights, App. 269, that all “[t]he police officers” 
are implicated in a cover-up, App. 493, and that each of them 
“perjured themselves,” App. 492, in “covering up” the use of 
excessive force and “protecting each other,” App. 495. 
Because he adduced evidence to support those allegations 
“such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict” in his favor, 
Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248, we will reverse District Court’s 
entry of summary judgment on Counts V and VI to the extent 
they allege after-the-fact conspiracies, and we will remand for 
further proceedings on those claims against the Individual 
Defendants. 
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IV. Conclusion 
For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm in part and 
reverse in part and will remand for proceedings consistent with 
this opinion.  
